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NOTES
Who Owns the Great Lakes? Posturing for Control
of an International Resource
by David S. Hoffmann*
I. INTRODUCTION
n August, 1981, a Montana coal company approached the state of
Wisconsin with a proposal to build a two thousand mile pipeline from
Gilette, Wyoming to Superior, Wisconsin.1 The company wanted to pump
water from Lake Superior to the coalfields of Montana for use in a net-
work of coal slurry pipelines2 to other parts of the country.3 The proposal
was ultimately shelved because of economic considerations and political
opposition," but its implications stirred up considerable apprehension
*J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University (1984).
I Quade, Water Wars Predicted for a Thirsty Nation, 68 A.B. J. 1066 (1982); Golden,
The OPEC of the Midwest, Tim, Aug. 2, 1982, at 80.
Transporting coal by pipeline involves a three step process. First, ground coal is
mixed with an equal volume of water and held in storage tanks equipped with agitators to
prevent settling before the mixture is introduced into the pipeline. Second, the slurry is
propelled at about four miles per hour by pump stations located at fifty to one hundred and
fifty mile intervals along the pipeline's length. Third, the slurry is again held in agitating
storage tanks at the pipeline terminus until the coal and water are separated by certifuga-
tion. The coal is then dried and ready for boiler preparation. See Webber, Coal Slurry Pipe-
lines are Ready, Willing and Unable to Get There, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 765, 769-70 (1980).
Coal slurry pipelines have proven to be cost effective and competitive to rail transport pri-
marily in the high volume, long distance transportation market. Id. at 768, 770-71. However,
several western states have banned the use of interstate waters for such purposes. See, e.g.,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-104 (1981), which provides in relevant part: "(1) The legislature
finds that the use of water for slurry transport of coal is detrimental to the conservation and
protection of the water resources of the state. (2) The use of water for the slurry transport
of coal is not a beneficial use."
3 Quade, supra note 1, at 1066. The network of pipelines was to transport coal to sev-
eral western generating plants. Id.
4 The costs of bringing water across this distance is presently not economically feasible.
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among Great Lakes states about future control over the vast resources of
the lakes.
5
Fearing further diversion requests, the officials from the eight Great
Lakes states, and the two Canadian Provinces, met recently in Mackinac
Island, Michigan.6 The conferees adopted several resolutions, one of
which requires their unanimous approval for any future diversion re-
quests.' One of the most significant reasons for this unanimously ap-
In all likelihood, Canada and Ontario would oppose any attempt of such a diversion. See
GREAT LAKES REGIONAL OFFICE, THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, 8 Focus ON GREAT
LAKES WATER QUALITY 8 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Focus ON GREAT LAKES WATER
QUALITY].
Presently, there is no existing comprehensive management agency that has the power
to dispose of this issue. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
6 The Great Lake states are New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois,
Wisconsin and Minnesota. The two Canadian Provinces are Ontario and Quebec. Prelimi-
nary Proceedings, 1982 Great Lakes Water Resources Conference (June 9-11, 1982) (availa-
ble from the Michigan Department of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as Proceedings]. The
lakes are potentially the most viable new source for arid western regions. The lakes are the
largest body of freshwater in the world, comprising approximately 95,000 square miles, one-
fifth of the total surface freshwater. Id. at 7.
The resolution on diversions provides that:
WHEREAS, the States and Provinces in the Great Lakes Basin have been
blessed with an incomparable water resource; and
WHEREAS, increasing evidence points to severe freshwater shortages in
other parts of the United States, shortages that already are apparent and are ex-
pected to reach major proportions in the next decade; and
WHEREAS, the search already has begun for alternative sources of water for
those regions, with support for some of that search coming from the United States
Federal Government; and
WHEREAS, the water of the Great Lakes is needed to meet the current and
future domestic, industrial, navigational, power, agricultural and recreational
needs of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence region; and
WHEREAS, the findings of the International Joint Commission's Great
Lakes Diversions and Consumptive Uses Study Board indicates that we will be
faced with substantial increases in consumptive uses within the Basin over the
next half century to meet our own growing needs; and
WHEREAS, the diversion of water from the Great Lakes Basin to other water
basins reduces the net supply of water available to the Great Lakes Basin and
lowers lake levels; and
WHEREAS, lowered lake levels and reduction of flows in connecting channels
could result in serious losses in water supply, navigation and recreational values
causing critical economic, social and environmental problems adverse to the peo-
ple of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence States and Provinces; and
WHEREAS, the wise use and development of the water resources of the
Great Lakes is essential to the economy and prosperity of the Great Lakes and St.
Lawrence States and Provinces; and
WHEREAS, the diversion of Great Lakes waters to other regions of the
United States or Canada could result in severe restrictions in the growth and de-
velopment of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence region; and
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proved resolution was a hope to lure major industrial firms back to the
economically depressed Great Lakes region.' Evidence introduced at the
conference indicated that lower lake levels created by diversions would
have wide-ranging environmental and economic impacts on the region.'
The availability of adequate water supplies is rapidly becoming "the
most serious long-range problem now confronting the nation; potentially
more serious than the energy crisis." 10 Supplies are dwindling in the west
and many states are looking for new sources, not only for mining, but for
agricultural and domestic use as well.1 ' Unless there is a shift in alloca-
WHEREAS, it makes far more sense for development to occur where abun-
dant supplies of fresh water already exist, rather than moving the water to other
regions; and
WHEREAS, we share in the responsibility for the stewardship of the tremen-
dons natural resources which the Great Lakes provide; and
WHEREAS, the Boundary Waters Agreement of 1909 requires that any
change in the flows and levels of any boundary waters is subject to approval by
the federal governments of both the United States and Canada.
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by the Great Lakes States and
Provinces that based on existing information they object to any new diversion of
Great Lakes water for use outside the Great Lakes States and Provinces; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that no future diversions be considered until
a thorough assessment, involving all jurisdictions contiguous to the Great Lakes
System, of the impacts on navigation, power generation, environment and socio-,
economic development for all said jurisdictions takes place.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that any future decision on the diversion of
Great Lakes water for use outside of the Great Lakes States and Provinces be
made only with the concurrence of the Great Lakes States, the United States Fed-
eral Government, and the Federal Government of Canada and the Provinces con-
tiguous to the Great Lakes system.
Proceedings, supra note 6 (supp.). All told, eight resolutions were adopted including Great
Lakes water quality and consumptive uses. The resolution on diversions was singled out
here to illustrate the potential conflicting objectives the Great Lakes states perceive in fu-
ture management of this abundant resource. Obviously, the states' desire for increasing con-
trol is equally applicable to the latter areas of concern. Diversions, however, have possibly
the most serious economic implications for the states in terms of their growth and
development.
8 Proceedings, supra note 6, at 5, 12.
" An engineer testifying at the Conference pointed out that the Montana pipeline diver-
sion would require approximately 10,000 cubic feet per second, which would lower interlock-
ing lake levels enough to cause a $35 million loss in navigational revenues and eighty million
in electrical generating capacity. Golden, supra note 1, at 81.
11 Proceedings, supra note 6, at 9 (quoting the acting director of the U.S. Resources
Council).
" Significant water supply problems exist or are aniicipated in southern California, the
Great Basin, the Lower Colorado, the Rio Grande, the high plains of Texas and the south-
central portion of the Mississippi River Basin. Many of these areas are large consumers of
water for irrigated agricultural production. Expected water use for development and
processing of coal and oil-shale deposits in a few of these areas will add to the difficulties.
SENATE COMM. ON THE ENVIRONMENT PUBLIC WORKs, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STATE AND NA-
1984
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tion, lack of water may severely limit growth and development in some of
the more critically depleted areas. 1
2
In recent years, there have been several proposals to divert water for
interstate use.' s Few of these proposals have survived economic and polit-
ical barriers.14 If, however, present conditions hold true and large scale
diversions become economically feasible, 5 several institutional and politi-
cal questions will have to be answered. For example, is there a presently
existing federal, state, provincial or combined agency capable of dealing
with the complexity of issues involved? Can the Great Lakes states and
TIONAL WATER USE TRENDS TO THE YEAR 2000, at 9, 10 (Comm. Print 1980).
12 Id. at 10. Irrigation in the Great Plains states depends primarily upon the Oglalla
aquifer, an enormous underground reservoir covering 160,000 square miles extending from
western Texas to northern Nebraska. However:
[The aquifer] is being so rapidly depleted by agriculture that some areas may ap-
proach the end of their water by the year 2000 and most other areas by 2020. A
recent study . . . reported that irrigation scheduling-tighter control of flow to
farmers' fields-could cut Ogialla depletion by 15% to 20% [while] farmers can be
expected to shift to crops with lower water requirements. Such changes of habit
will only moderate depletion, not stop it. Water shortages bring to the economy of
the Great Plains-and of the world supply-[a] demand [for] a more extravagant
solution.
Opie, Draining America Dry, PROoRESSIVE, July 1981, at 20.
,3 There is currently one operating coal-slurry pipeline in the United States between
northern Arizona and southern Nevada, although several have been proposed for the major
western coal producing states. Tarlock, Western Water Law and Coal Development, 51 U.
COLO. L. REv. 511, 538 (1980). South Dakota has recently agreed to sell a portion of its share
of the Missouri River to coal companies in Wyoming for pipeline use. Golden, supra note 1,
at 80. Perhaps the most innovative and by far the largest interbasin diversion proposed is
the North American Water and Power Alliance (NAWAPA) project. At a total capital in-
vestment of $100 billion (at 1964 prices) over a twenty year construction period, the project
was designed to bring water (approximately 110 million acre feet) from the northwestern
part of the continent to seven provinces of Canada, thirty-three states in the United States,
and three states in Mexico. The Ralph M. Parsons Co., NAWAPA: North American Water
and Power Alliance, Brochure 606-2934-19 (no date). As the two authors note, "the eco-
nomic, hydrological, and ecological impacts of a project this size would be profound...
[requiring] institutional and political arrangements and agreements ... devised on a scale
never before attempted." C. HOWE & K. EASTER, INTERBASiN TRANSFERS OF WATER 5 (1971).
14 Consider this account of the reaction to the South Dakota sale:
South Dakota's Sioux Indians... are contemplating a suit [under the doctrine of
federally reserved water rights]. So are two downriver states, Missouri and Ne-
braska.... At the Midwest Governors meeting which unanimously passed a reso-
lution calling on Congress to leave the region's water riches under control of the
states, Iowa Governor Robert Ray denounced South Dakota's action as a neigh-
bor's breach of faith. Said he: "What bothers me most is not the amount [to be]
diverted, which is comparatively small, but the precedent. Other concerned states
should have a voice when water that would normally flow to us is diverted for
projects that do not benefit us and are located outside our area."
Golden, supra note 1, at 81.
"I See supra note 4.
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provinces prohibit the transfer of interstate water? Will the states and
provinces be adequately represented if they cannot unilaterally prohibit
such a transfer? What are the costs and benefits to regional interests?
What weight should be given to Canadian interests? The resolution of
these issues will require innovation and invention beyond the competence
of any existing institutional framework,16 particularly when applied to the
enormous physical, economic and political dimensions of the Great Lakes
Basin.17
Although a comprehensive analysis of the Great Lakes diversion dis-
pute would require nothing short of a major treatise, this note examines
the problem from a broader, simplified perspective in order to begin to
understand and resolve the underlying issues.18 The first section is an
overview of the major components of contemporary law governing the
Great Lakes. This includes state law 9 and federal law under the U.S.
constitutional doctrines of the interstate commerce clause,20 the treaty
power,2' the compact consent clause2 2 and Canadian provincial and do-
minion law. The second section focuses on the Chicago Ship Canal diver-
sion to highlight the concern that current institutions are inadequate
frameworks for resolving future diversion requests.23 The third section ex-
amines the economic and political implications of the Great Lakes states'
and provinces' unprecedented attempt to control this major international
resource.24 Finally, this note concludes that the states and provinces may
achieve representation in a cooperative arrangement with both federal
governments.2"
II. PRESENT LAW GOVERNING THE GREAT LAKES
Regulations and use of the waters of the Great Lakes are governed by
a complex array of state and federal court decisions, administrative agen-
cies, local, state and federal statutes, and federal treaties.26 Overlaying
16 C. HowE & K. EASTER, supra note 13, at 5.
"See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
IS There are literally hundreds of minor issues when one considers the multitude of
jurisdictions, agencies, and interests of the thirty-five million people living within the Great
Lakes Basin.
"See infra notes 29-50 and accompanying text.
'o See infra notes 57-88 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 102-17 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 161-83 and accompanying text.
z' See infra notes 184-227 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
26 No attempt is made here to catalog the entire legal framework of the Great Lakes.
For a description of the vast array of agencies and organizations in Canada and the United
States, see THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, GREAT LAKES DIRE ToRY (1976).
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this regulatory maze are the physical characteristics of the lakes 7 and the
jurisdictional authority and concerns of two nations, two provinces and
eight states. Under such restraints, confusion and conflict are often inevi-
table.18 To simplify matters, the scope of this note is limited to examining
prospective diversion requests in a broad, but manageable legal and doc-
trinal framework under which this issue may be resolved.
A. United States
1. State Law
The international boundary between the United States and Canada
traverses the middle of four of the five Great Lakes (Lake Michigan lies
entirely within the territorial United States). According to article H of
the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty29 and the customary rules of interna-
tional law, the Great Lakes are considered national waters.30 In other
words, each sovereign retains jurisdiction and control over the use of all
water on its respective side of the international boundary.3 ' In effect,
however, the state governments maintain dominion or ownership of the
water and lake beds within their own territorial limits 2 subject to a supe-
rior federal power, particularly control over interstate commerce.3 " Thus,
under the Constitution, state regulation of water use is specifically de-
rived from its police powers.34 Although the states have created numerous
agencies to cope with particular aspects of Great Lakes resource manage-
ment,3 5 they took a significant and controversial step toward acquiring
27 See supra note 6.
28 GREAT LAKES BASIN COMMISSION, APPENDIX 1, ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS 303 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as APPENDIX 1].
29 Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters Between United States and Canada, Jan. 11,
1909, United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548 [hereinafter cited as Bound-
ary Waters Treaty].
30 See generally D. PIPER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE GREAT LAKES 18-20 (1967).
31 Id. at 19.
2 Id. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 123.03 (Page 1978) which states in relevant part-
[Tlhe waters of Lake Erie consisting of the territory within the boundaries of the
State, extending from the southerly shore of Lake Erie to the international bound-
ary line between the United States and Canada, together with the soil beneath...
belong to the State... for public uses to which it may be adapted, subject to the
power of the United States Government to public rights of navigation, water com-
merce and fishery and further subject to the property rights of littoral owners,
including the right to make reasonable use of the waters in front of or flowing past
their lands.
:3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24 U.S. CONST. amend. X. See generally GREAT LAKES BASIN COMMISSION, APPENDIX
S20, STATE LAW, POLICIES, AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (1976) [hereinafter cited as
APPENDIX S20].
25 For a survey of state powers, programs, policies and institutional arrangements, see
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broad policymaking authority when they created the Great Lakes Basin
Compact (Compact)38 and the Great Lakes Commission (Commission).3 7
The Council of State Governments classifies the Basin Compact as
"advisory and recommendatory," but the provisions of article 1 of the
Compact appear to vest the Commission with a significant amount of dor-
mant or reserve power which to date has not been exercised.38 The mem-
ber states, however, encountered considerable difficulty in obtaining the
1968 grant of congressional consent.39 It was clear to Congress that the
purpose of the Compact's authors was to create an international agency
with broad policymaking powers under the directives of state and provin-
cial representation. 40 Such an agreement, according to Congress, was a
potential encroachment upon "substantive federal interests, '"1 namely,
Congress' authority over a major navigable waterway and the delegated
authority of the U.S. Department of State in the conduct of international
affairs. 4 2 The agreement that Congress eventually adopted contained a
severability clause which effectively restated the Commission's role as
solely a "consultative and recommendatory" agency and excluded provin-
cial government participation-in effect, prohibiting the Commission
from acting independently in international affairs.4 3 Moreover, the Com-
mission was denied any preeminent role in management of the Great
Lakes Basin.44
State regulation of the Great Lakes is generally confined to police
power prerogatives to regulate the health, safety and welfare of its citi-
zens. 5 In practice, this authority manifests itself in control of local water
uses such as municipal, industrial and irrigational supplies. 46 It is inter-
esting to note that the states were originally empowered by Congress to
regulate water pollution.47 This approach, however, proved to be ineffec-
tive48 and Congress subsequently shifted regulatory authority to the Fed-
APPENDIX S20, supra note 34, at 51-171.
" Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968).
37 Id. at 415 (art. IV).
See M. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE CoMPAcTS: A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM 157 (1971).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 161.
42 Id.
48 See Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, art. IX, 82 Stat. 414, 418-419
(1968).
" M. RIDGEWAY, supra note 38, at 159.
'5 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
"See generally APPENDIX S20, supra note 34.
47 See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3668, 3669.
45 See Case Comment, States May No Longer Bring a Federal Common Law Nuisance
Action to Abate Interstate Water Pollution: City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 7 DAYTON L.
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eral Environmental Protection Agency through the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972.:1 Furthermore, state attempts to
encroach on federal authority have failed to win Congressional approval.50
2. Federal Law
The U.S. Constitution has several provisions granting the federal
government express authority to develop and manage national water re-
sources. Chief among these enumerated powers are the commerce
power, 51 the treaty power52 and the compact consent power.5 3 General
water resource policy is oriented toward accommodating "maximization
of beneficial uses for the greatest number of persons to minimal interfer-
ences with the resources themselves and the ecosystems supported by
them."" In other words, federal authority promotes the general welfare of
all citizens when the balance must be struck between development and
conservation. This balancing also considers individual strivings on the
one hand and the.government's stewardship responsibilities in maintain-
ing the nation's resources on the other. 6
a. The Commerce Power
As navigable waters,57 the Great Lakes are subject to the Congres-
sional commerce power which includes the power to regulate the naviga-
ble capacity of the lakes .5 To make this control effective, the Supreme
REV. 511, 513-14 (1982). The state approach failed for two reasons. First, almost half the
states had failed to submit pollution standards four years after the deadline. Second, the
statutory enforcement mechanisms failed to deter major violators. Id. at 514.
'9 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
" See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (power to regulate interstate commerce).
82 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (delegating the treaty-making power to the President
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate).
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (power to consent to interstate compacts).
APPENDIX S20, supra note 34, at 1.
55 Id.
" Id.
57 The test for navigability is not whether waters are subject to the ebb and flow of tide,
but whether they are navigable in fact. "When they are used, or are susceptible of being
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce .... " The Daniel Ball, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
68 As stated in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173 (1979):
Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate commerce comprehends the
control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of
the United States which are accessible from a State other than those in which
they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the nation and subject to
all the requisite legislation by Congress [quoting Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S.
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Court has determined that Congress has not only the power to keep navi-
gable waters open and unencumbered, but also the power to provide sanc-
tions against navigable interference with these waters.59 The Court also
stated, in United States v. Appalacian Power Co.,60 that federal control
over navigable waters contemplates flood protection and recovery of im-
provement costs through utilization of power. The Court, in Appalacian
Power, upheld a federal license to construct a dam in a navigable stream
despite an argument that denial of the license was attendant to the legiti-
mate exercise of state police powers.6 ' In United States v. Twin City
Power Co.,62 the Court characterized the navigational power as a privilege
to invoke "dominant servitude" which could be "asserted to the exclusion
of any competing or conflicting [power]." 6 The Court held that even
though state law recognized that private owners had interests in naviga-
ble waters, the landowners had no right to compensation for federal im-
provements to navigation since Congress had complete power to preempt
any other authority in this area. 4
Pursuant to its authority to regulate navigation, Congress has dele-
gated primary authority to the Secretary of the Army to regulate "the
use, administration and navigation of navigable waters" in the public in-
terest."5 Outside of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps), which is the implementing arm of the Secre-
tary of the Army, represents the continuing and most pervasive presence
in the Great Lakes Basin. The Corps maintains the navigable capacity of
the lakes and ensures adequate supplies for public uses. 6
In addition to their navigational importance, the Great Lakes are uti-
lized for consumptive uses in industry, agriculture and as drinking water,
and such non-consumptive uses as recreation and fishing.6 7 In this sense,
(3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1866)].
5, See Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 725 (1866).
60 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940).
a' Id. at 427.
42 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
" Id. at 224-25. See also United States v. Grand River Dam Auth. 363 U.S. 229 (1960)
where the Court stated:
[A]n interest [in navigable streams] is not compensable because when the United
States asserts its superior authority under the Commerce Clause to utilize or regu-
late the flow of water of a navigable stream there is no "taking" of "property" in
the sense of the Fifth Amendment because the United States has a superior navi-
gation easement which precludes private ownership of the water or its flow.
Id. at 231-32.
" Twin City Power, 350 U.S. at 226.
66 33 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
See Proceedings, supra note 6, at 13.
67 The Boundary Waters Treaty considers water supply for domestic and industrial
uses as primary to navigational purposes. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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the lakes are analogous to coal or ground water or any other natural re-
source subject to traditional commerce clause scrutiny. Generally, how-
ever, historical attempts by states to control natural resources have been
invalidated by the Supreme Court on commerce clause grounds particu-
larly when the control works to the benefit of local concerns."' For exam-
ple, in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,9 the Court struck down a state
statute limiting the export of natural gas in order to assure adequate sup-
plies for in-state residents. In Altus v. Carr,7 0 the Court affirmed a lower
court decision invalidating a state prohibition on the export of ground
water. Applying the rationale of Altus, the Court in Sporhase v. Ne-
braska7 1 held that ground water, once withdrawn from the earth and
available in the marketplace, is an article of commerce.72 In Sporhase, the
Court struck down a Nebraska statutory provision that required the con-
suming state to grant a reciprocal right to withdraw and use water in
Nebraska.78 The Court, however, recognized the state's legitimate conser-
vation and preservation interests in scarce water resources, but concluded
that Nebraska had failed to establish a close means-to-ends relationship
between the effective total ban on exporting water and the purpose to
conserve and preserve water supplies. 4
In recent years, the Supreme Court has taken a more deferential
stance in reviewing non-discriminatory regulation of natural resources
than it has in other areas of commerce.7 5 In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery,7 6 the Court upheld a state ban which included non-recycled
plastic containers, but excluded paperboard containers. Despite an argu-
ment claiming that the ban was enacted for the benefit of local interests,
the Court concluded that appreciable environmental benefits of energy
and resource conservation outweighed any incidental burdens on inter-
state commerce.
77
The Court also rejected challenges to Montana's thirty percent coal
" See Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts: The Role of the Federal Courts, 6 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REv. 241 (1982).
69 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
70 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
7- 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
72 Id. at 949-50.
73 Id. at 957-58.
7 Id. The Sporhase decision contained some interesting language on the interstate
character of the Oglalla acquifer that supplies most of the irrigation water to western states.
The Court noted that 80% of western water supplies are used for irrigation to produce
agricultural products for worldwide markets. Thus, the Court concluded that there was a
significant federal interest in conservation as well as for fair allocation of this diminishing
resource. Id. at 953-54.
75 See Stewart, supra note 68.
76 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
77 Id. at 473.
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severance tax in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana.78 The tax was
facially non-discriminatory since consumers within the state were taxed
at the same rate, but discriminatory in effect since Montana exports
ninety percent of its coal to other states.79 Eastern utility purchasers of
the coal argued that Montana was exploiting its resource-rich, monopoly
position by exporting tax burdens to other states.8 0 The Court, however,
held that the tax was formally non-discriminatory and sustained the
tax.8 ' The Court also emphasized its inability to measure the appropriate
allocation of tax burdens on the ultimate consumer of the state's
resources.
82
Beyond the commerce power, Congress has broad authority to man-
age the vast resources of federal lands83 and to preempt state laws which
affect the use and development of those resources.8 ' Congress also has the
power to tax mineral development85 and the use of common resources
such as air and water.8 ' Congress has exerted its spending power to con-
trol pollution and waste disposal problems 87 and to subsidize resource-
poor states while compensating resource-rich states for compliance with
federal development controls. 8
Thus, federal management of the Great Lakes is a pervasive power to
regulate not only related navigational needs, but other uses which affect
interstate markets. The Supreme Court, however, has recently displayed
a willingness to uphold non-discriminatory state control of natural re-
sources in the absence of federal preemption.
b. The Treaty Power
Treaties are contracts between sovereign countries89 which are con-
sidered the supreme law of the land under the U.S. Constitution. ° Valid
treaties such as friendship, commerce and navigation treaties preempt
78 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
7 Id. at 617-18.
80 Id. at 619.
1' Id. at 617-29.
82 Id. at 627.
3 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (wildlife regulation); Cappert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (water).
85 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
s See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7405, 7544 (Supp. M 1979); Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6931 (1976).
87 See Stewart, supra note 68, at 256.
8 Id.
8o See Dreyfus v. Von Firck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835
(1976).
go U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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any inconsistent state law. 1 The treaty power "can limit, cancel, or pre-
vent state water law or its implementation on international waters and
Federal authorities may act to prevent this type of state action.912
Reciprocal navigation between Canada and the United States on the
Great Lakes is guaranteed by the comprehensive Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909.9s This treaty "forever" guarantees free and open naviga-
tion of all navigable waters.94 However, each government retains the right
to promulgate laws or regulations governing the use of waters within its
own territory, provided the laws are applied "equally and without dis-
crimination."9 5 Notwithstanding this guarantee, the treaty provides the
following order of precedence for use of the boundary waters: (1) uses for
domestic and sanitary purposes; (2) uses for navigation; and, (3) uses for
power and irrigation. Despite the secondary importance of navigation,
each government may divert water within its own territory, provided the
other government does not object on the ground of material injury to
navigational interests within its territory.97
As of 1981, there were over forty bilateral Great Lakes treaties and
agreements between the United States and Canada covering such diverse
areas as lake levels,98 fishery management,99 navigational improvements 00
and boundary waters pollution.10 1 These international agreements re-
present the continued, binding commitment of both sovereign countries
to fulfill mutual interests and, as such, are accorded primary importance
in Great Lakes management.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation, Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899)
(treaty with New Mexico overrules state water appropriation laws); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co.,
643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g granted, 654 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 664 F.2d
480 (5th Cir. 1981), reinstated, 664 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1981) (treaty with Japan supercedes
federal statute).
92 See APPENDIX S20, supra note 34, at 5.
Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 29.
The agreement extends to Lake Michigan and all canals connecting the boundary
waters. Id. at 2449 (art. I).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 2451 (art. VIII). This article also provides that any use which materially con-
flicts or restrains any other use which is higher in order of precedence is forbidden.
01 Id. at 2449 (art. III). See also D. PIPER, supra note 30, at 50.
98 Convention Respecting Emergency Regulation of Level of Rainy Lake and of Other
Boundary Waters in the Rainy Lake Watershed, Sept. 15, 1938, United States-Canada, 54
Stat. 1800, T.S. No. 961.
99 Great Lakes Fisheries, Sept. 10, 1954, United States-Canada, 6 U.S.T. 2836, T.LA.S.
No. 3326.
100 Saint Lawrence Seaway: Navigational Improvements of the Great Lakes Connecting
Channels, Apr. 9, 1957, United States-Canada, 8 U.S.T. 637, T.I.A.S. No. 3814.
101 Great Lakes Water Quality, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 1383,
T.I.A.S. No. 9257.
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c. The Compact Consent Power
Although states generally have the power to enter into reciprocal ar-
rangements without congressional approval, they may not form any com-
bination tending to increase their political power as states or interfere
with the supremacy of the federal government.0 2 For example, the Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of a multistate tax compact
which lacked congressional consent in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Commission.'0 ' The Court's opinion focused on the substance and effect
of the agreement, not on its form. 1'0 Despite U.S. Steel's claim that the
compact violated the consent and commerce clauses and would increase
the risk of double taxation, the majority determined that the compact
would promote uniformity of state taxes on multistate corporations and
decrease the risk" of double taxation. 0 5 The majority concluded that ab-
sent a threat of encroachment or interference through enhanced state
power, the existence of a federal interest in apportioning multistate in-
come is irrelevant. 06 Thus, the fear that interstate agreements will en-
croach upon federal supremacy is related, in part, to the federalist frame-
work and to the efficient allocation of resources corresponding to the
objectives behind antitrust laws. 0 7
On the other hand, an interstate compact with congressional ap-
proval has the status of federal law and preempts any existing or subse-
quently enacted inconsistent state law.'0 8 The question has arisen
whether congressional consent merely removes a constitutional ban to
otherwise permissible concerted state action and thereby exhausts Con-
gress' authority to subsequently revoke or amend the agreement. 0 9 In
1855, the Court held that Congress may enact legislation incompatible to
a compact which had obtained prior congressional consent.1 0 The Court
relied on the rationale that one Congress may not impair the Constitu-
tional legislative authority of a subsequent Congress."' Furthermore, con-
gressional understanding as to the intent of the compacting states is con-
102 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 472 (1978).
I03 d.
I" Id. at 467-78.
105 Id. at 472-76.
106 Id. at 479-80 n.33.
107 See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
,18 See, e.g., Bush v. Muncy, 659 F.2d 402 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910
(1982) (Interstate Agreement on Detainers prevails over state law); Kansas City Area
Transp. Auth. v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1981) (Missouri sales tax did not impose
burden on interstate agreement and therefore valid).
109 See J. MuYs, INTERSTATE WATER CoMPAcTs 288-89 (1981).
"0 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 432-33 (1855).
Id. at 433.
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trolling upon judicial review.112
Interstate compacts which involve foreign sovereign participation
raise the added dimension of the power to conduct international rela-
tions. Previously, state cooperation with foreign governments required
prior approval of the U.S. Department of State on modes of cooperation
and the type of endeavour intended to be pursued.113 This concern is pre-
cisely why the Great Lakes Compact failed initially to win congressional
approval. 4 Few such compacts have been enacted and only for rather
narrow, non-political and non-economic purposes.115
Thus, interstate compacts afford an additional layer of state control
prerogatives over regional resources, but are still within congressional
oversight to revoke or amend the compact's directives. In fashioning in-
terstate compacts, state participants must be sensitive to the uniformity
of regulation and efficient allocation of resources within the federalist
framework. The Supreme Court has encouraged states to resolve water
disputes through interstate compacts, 1 but such compacts must still sur-
vive commerce clause scrutiny.117
B. Canada
Although not as comprehensive as the U.S. Constitution, the British
North American (BNA) Act of 1867118 created the foundation for the Do-
minion of Canada by uniting the four original provinces: Ontario, Quebec,
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The BNA Act has subsequently pro-
vided the bond between the provinces which compose the present day
Canadian Federation.119 Among its more significant provisions, the BNA
Act outlines the distribution of power between the Dominion and the
.12 See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (legislative history of the Boul-
der Canyon Project Act shows that Congress intended the Secretary of the Interior to decide
water apportionment).
12" See 22 U.S.C. §§ 841-43 (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-465, § 2205(1), 94 Stat.
2025, 2159 (1980).
" For a discussion of the international question in the Great Lakes Compact consent
hearings, see M. RIDGEWAY, supra note 38, at 158-69.
"I Only one of the four presently approved interstate international compacts has au-
thority over the preservation of a significant natural resource: The Northeastern Forest Fire
Protection Compact, Pub. L. No. 129, 63 Stat. 271 (1949) (establishing a commission to
promote effective prevention and control of forest fires in the New England states and ad-
joining Canadian provinces). See THE COUNCL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INTERSTATE COM-
PACTS AND AGENCIES (1979).
16 See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S.
941, 959-60 (1982).
117 See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 960.
18 British North American Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. 3, ch. 3 (Canada, amended 1967)
[hereinafter cited as BNA Act].
120 R. DAWSON, THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 58 (1979).
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provinces. 20
The scheme adopted in the BNA Act is fundamentally different from
the framework of the U.S. Constitution. Each level of government is given
exclusive legislative authority defined by an enumerated list of subjects
found in sections 91 and 92 of the BNA Act.
122
1. Provincial Law
Similar to the situation in the Great Lakes states,"2 the jurisdic-
tional boundary of Ontario, the single Great Lakes province,"' extends as
far as the international boundary of the Great Lakes. 24 Ontario has also
determined that any provincial regulation affecting the water level of the
Great Lakes "shall conform to any order or recommendation" of the In-
ternational Joint Commission pursuant to the Commission's authority
under the Boundary Waters Treaty. 25
Section 92 of the BNA Act lists the chief provincial powers giving the
provinces exclusive authority to make laws in 16 enumerated areas.'26
These areas include the management and sale of public lands belonging
to the province,"27 direct taxation within the province in order to raise
revenues for provincial purposes 2 8 and the establishment of public works
which are located entirely within the province. 2 9 Provincial powers are as
comprehensive as those of the federal government within these areas and
both units of government can delegate such authority to inferior units of
government, but not to each other. 30
Under section 92(5) of the BNA Act and the Canadian Supreme
Court's holding in R. v. Moss,'5 ' dominion over the beds "of the Great
Lakes vests within the provincial government. The Great Lakes them-
"'0 BNA Act, 30 & 31 Vict. 3, 16-18, §§ 91, 92.
121 Crommelin, Jurisdiction Over Onshore Oil and Gas in Canada, 10 U. Brr. COLUM.
L. REv. 86, 87 (1975).
"I1 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
121 Although Quebec is within the Great Lakes watershed and its participation at the
Mackinac Island Conference was essential, Quebec's jurisdiction is limited to the upper por-
tion of the St. Lawrence Seaway. For purposes here, the discussion is confined to Ontario
provincial law recognizing that Quebec's interest in Great Lakes decision-making is equally
compelling.
124 8 ONT. RE V. STAT., ch. 497, § 9 (1980).
125 4 ONT. REv. STAT., ch. 229, § 15(1) (1980).
121 BNA Act, 30 & 31 Vict. 3, 17-18, § 92.
127 Id. § 92(5).
118 Id. § 92(2).
120 Id. § 92(10).
110 Nova Scotia Delegation Reference, 1951 S.C.R. 31, 34-35. See R. DAwsoN, supra
note 119, at 79.
231 [1896] 26 S.C.R. 322.
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selves are also considered provincial property. In the Fisheries case,132 the
Dominion argued that the large fresh water lakes, particularly the Great
Lakes, fell within the Dominion's authority over trade and commerce, de-
fense, navigation and shipping and inland fisheries and therefore, be-
longed to the Dominion. 13 3 Although the Privy Council avoided the issue,
the Supreme Court of Canada was clear in determining that all waters
within a province, except those within public harbors, vest to that
province.' 3'
Regional provincial interests are a critical issue in the recent Cana-
dian constitutional debates particularly in view of the sustained threat by
Quebec to secede from the Dominion Federation. 13 The resource-rich
western provinces have already taken significant steps toward control of
provincial resource development as well as measures to secure a greater
share of resource revenues.'
Recent Canadian Supreme Court decisions, however, have curtailed
provincial efforts to capitilize on resource development. In Canadian In-
dustrial Gas & Oil v. Saskatchewan,"17 the Court held that an attempt by
Saskatchewan to impose a mineral tax and royalty surcharge on provin-
cial oil production was an indirect tax and therefore ultra vires under
section 92(2) of the BNA Act."8 The Court also reasoned that such taxes
were also beyond provincial power since they interfered with inter-
provincial and international trade and commerce."39 Similarly, in Central
Canada Potash v. Saskatchewan,"4 0 the Court struck down provincial
regulations governing the marketing of potash through fixed minimum
selling prices in which the only significant market was the export market.
Saskatchewan characterized the measure as an attempt to conserve pot-
ash, but the Court determined the real effect was to regulate extra-pro-
vincial trade."' The Court, nevertheless, was careful to point out that the
consequence of invalidating the regulations was not to shift the distribu-
tion of power to the federal government, but merely a determination of
the limitation on provincial authority."' Finally, in Seamen's Interna-
132 In re Provincial Fisheries, [1896] 26 S.C.R. 444, a'fld, Att'y Gen. of Canada v. Att'y
Gen. of Ontario, 1898 A.C. 700 (P.C.).
133 Att'y Gen. of Canada v. Att'y Gen. of Ontario, 1898 A.C. 700, 706.
"'4 In re Provincial Fisheries, [1896] 26 S.C.R. at 576.
"' See, e.g., Magnet, The Charter's Official Languages Provisions: The Implications of
Entrenched Bilingualism, 4 Sup. CT. L. REv. 163 (1982).
13' Moull, Natural Resources: The Other Crisis in Canadian Federalism, 18 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 1, 3 (1980).
.37 80 D.L.R.3d 449 (1978).
'" Id. at 463.
139 Id. at 483-84.
140 88 D.L.R.3d 609 (1979).
141 Id. at 631.
14 Id. For a criticism of these two cases, see Moull, supra note 136.
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tional Union v. Crosby International Services,143 the Court provided an
important benchmark in the current dispute between federal and provin-
cial control of offshore resources. Although the Court concentrated upon
jurisdiction of the Canadian Labor Relations Board, the case "serves as a
reminder that the legal regime for [resource] development on the Cana-
dian continental margin, be it federal or provincial, will not displace the
existing framework which determines the respective spheres of federal
and provincial jurisdiction.' 14 4
2. Federal Law
Section 91 of the BNA Act lists the chief federal or Dominion pow-
ers.1 5 In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, the central government is
vested with residual authority beyond the explicit powers granted to the
provincial legislatures. The enumerated list simply provides "for greater
certainty, but not so as to restrict the generality" of the residual clause.146
Among the more significant exclusive powers given to the Dominion
are the powers to regulate trade and commerce,"47 to raise money by any
mode or system of taxation,"48 and to exercise authority over navigation,
shipping" 9 and sea coast and inland fisheries. 150 Although the BNA Act
contains no express treaty-making provision, there is little uncertainity
where the power to negotiate treaties resides. Originally, it was the func-
tion of the Crown acting through the British government, but the author-
ity has gradually fallen within the control of the Dominion as a result of
the growth of Dominion self-government.' 5'
There is uncertainty, however, concerning the implementation of the
terms of treaties.152 Section 132 of the BNA Act appears to resolve the
question by granting the Dominion "all powers necessary or proper for
performing the obligations of Canada or of any province.., towards for-
eign countries arising under treaties.' ' 53 Nonetheless, the possibility ex-
ists that the Dominion, in performing this function, might infringe on ex-
clusive provincial authority.' 5' Conversely, it has been postulated that the
143 135 D.L.R.3d 485 (1982).
144 Gault, Recent Developments in the Federal-Provincial Dispute Concerning Juris-
diction Over Offshore Petroleum Resources, 21 ALTA. L. REV. 97, 98 (1983).
113 BNA Act, 30 & 31 Vict. 3, 16, § 91.
14s Id.
147 Id. § 91(2).
148 Id. § 91(3).
149 Id. § 91(10).
150 Id. § 91(12).
.1 M DAWSON, supra note 119, at 96.
152 Id.
153 BNA Act, 30 & 31 Vict. 3, 24, § 132.
I" R. DAWSON, supra note 119, at 96.
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provinces are fully competent to enter into transnational agreements that
do not have international law consequences.1 5 5
It is evident that the Canadian constitutional framework is very dif-
ferent from its U.S. counterpart. The limits of federal power cannot be
resolved without careful consideration of the exclusive powers of the re-
spective governments outlined in the BNA Act. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant difference from the United States is the exclusive right of the prov-
inces to make laws concerning "the management and sale of public lands
belonging to" the provinces. 5 ' This right, in combination with substantial
resource ownership, provides an effective counterforce to the Dominion's
commerce power. 57
Under the current proposed constitutional resolutions, the provinces
would enjoy concurrent authority to regulate the exportation of non-re-
newable natural resources, forestry resources and electrical energy. 58 In
the event of conflict, federal law would prevail. 59 The provinces would
also be prohibited from discriminatory treatment in price-setting and tax-
ation between export and interprovincial resource markets. The proposals
would also expressly provide for exclusive provincial authority to control
exploration, to regulate production and to develop and manage facilities
for producing electrical energy.16 0
III. HiSTORIcAL DEVELOPMENTS: THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION
AND THE CHICAGO DIVERSION
Currently, the Great Lakes states and provinces hold nothing more
than advisory status in water resource management of the Great Lakes
Basin. In light of diversion requests, the states and provinces, from crea-
tion of the Great Lakes Basin Compact to the Mackinac Island Resolu-
tion, sought individual representation in governing the Great Lakes'
resources.
Current disputes regarding the use of the Great Lakes' boundary wa-
ters are settled by the International Joint Commission (IJC or Commis-
sion), an investigatory and quasi-adjudicatory agency created by the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty (1909 Treaty). 6 ' The IJC's capability and ca-
pacity to deal with future diversion requests is weli illustrated in the long
56 Id. at 98 quoting E. MCWHINNEY, JUDIcIAL REVIEW 156 (1969).
156 BNA Act, 30 & 31 Vict. 3, 17, § 92(5).
157 Crommelin, supra note 121, at 143.
158 Laskin, The Canadian Constitutional Proposals, 1981 PuB. L. 340, 353.
159 Id.
160 Id.
"I See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 2449-50 (art. I). For a dated, but
comprehensive treatise on the Commission, see C. CHACKO, THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COM-
MISSION (1968).
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and persistent dispute concerning the diversion of water from Lake Mich-
igan into the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal and perhaps explains the
reluctance of the two governments to utilize the IJC.162
Before the signing of the 1909 Treaty, the Chicago Sanitary District
had obtained permission from the U.S. Secretary of War for the diversion
in order to flush sewage from the canal and to maintain its navigable
depth. 163 The diversion was considered in the 1909 Treaty negotiations,
but no specific provision dealing with the problem was incorporated in
the final document. 64
Chicago frequently sought both the Secretary and Congress' approval
to increase the amount diverted which prompted the federal government
to seek injunctive relief to prohibit Chicago from diverting in excess of
the originally authorized amount. 6 5 The city of Chicago argued that the
federal government had given its assent to the construction and improve-
ment of the sewage canal and therefore, the government was estopped
from denying the city the power to utilize the canal in the most effective
way to eliminate the risk of a health hazard."66 The government argued
that allowing Chicago to proceed with the diversion would result in lower
lake levels and alter the navigable capacity of the lakes.' 6' A unanimous
Court held that the United States had not only the power to prohibit
navigational obstructions in interstate commerce, but also an affirmative
obligation to uphold the provisions of the 1909 Treaty and therefore en-
joined Chicago from diverting the unauthorized excess.6 "
Shortly thereafter, six of the Great Lakes states filed suit to enjoin
Illinois and the Chicago District from the diversion entirely.6 " Asserting
their riparian interests, the plaintiff states argued that the diversion had
caused serious injury to both commercial navigation and private prop-
erty.2 0 The states also averred that the diversion was not justified for
162 The dispute has extended since the beginning of this century and has involved all
branches of government. This note provides only a brief summary of the major events. For a
detailed discussion from which this summary is taken, see M. RIDGEWAY, supra note 38, at
169-79; D. PIPER, supra note 30, at 90-103.
163 The initial diversion was less than 5000 cubic feet per second (c.f.s.). This amount
represents a net loss of water from the Great Lakes Basin since the water eventually flows
into the Mississippi River.
164 See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 29.
:15 Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
166 Id. at 412.
167 Id. at 423.
l68 Id. at 425-26. The Supreme Court stated that the diversion required the approval of
the two governments and the International Joint Commission. Id. at 426.
leg Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929). Several states had sued individually, but
were joined in this action. The Court had referred the diversion issue to a Special Master for
fact finding, conclusions of law and recommendations for a decree. 271 U.S. 650 (1926).
170 278 U.S. at 400.
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navigational purposes and was contrary to Congress' power to remove ob-
stacles from interstate commerce and discriminated in favor of Illinios to
the detriment of the other Great Lakes states. 71 Rejecting any contention
of a legitimate exercise of Illinois' police power, the Court held that the
diversion was impermissible, and ordered the District to gradually reduce
the diversion upon implementation of an alternative sewage plan.17 2
In 1957, the states filed an additional suit against Illinois requesting
the Supreme Court to reduce the diversion or limit Chicago's domestic
pumpage in order to reduce the total effect on navigation on the lakes." 3
The State of Illinois replied with a suit to prohibit the states from inter-
fering in a new water project that would require additional diverted
water. 17 4 The parties eventually agreed to accept a Special Master's diver-
sion limit which the Court decreed without considering the legal
arguments. 7 5
In short, the Chicago diversion controversy represents a problem not
only of considerable scientific complexity, but a problem of protecting
myraid interests of states and individuals as well. e7 6 The resolution of the
controversy appears to call for a uniquely qualified forum where all inter-
ests can be heard.
Outside the judicial arena, the only governmental agency remotely
competent to handle these sensitive issues in Great Lakes management is
the International Joint Commission.17 7 However, from the states' perspec-
tive, a number of legal barriers exist in the Commission's institutional
framework. First, the IJC is an independent international agency of the
U.S. and Canadian federal governments without state representation. The
Commission undertakes studies or matters of conflict only upon request
of either government. Furthermore, the Commission's reports are merely
171 Id. at 410, 415.
172 Id. at 420-21. The case was again referred to a Special Master to determine the
method and period required for an alternate plan. Id. at 421. The following year the Court
adopted the Master's reported results and reduction scheme. 281 U.S. 179 (1930). The re-
duced diversion was to average no more than 1500 c.f.s. (approximately one-third the
amount the Secretary had originally authorized), an amount the Court held would not affect
the interests of the plaintiff states. Id. at 199.
271 360 U.S. 712 (1959). The Court agreed to reconsider the entire issue and appointed a
Special Master to file a report. Id. at 714.
174 388 U.S. 426, 427 (1967). Additional proceedings *were filed in 1979 to modify provi-
sions of the decree and the Court again ordered a report from a Special Master. 441 U.S. 921
(1979). The decree was modified to assure that the District's diversion did not exceed au-
thorized limits. 449 U.S. 48 (1980).
175 Note that Arkansas and Missouri intervened as beneficiaries in the 1959 case in
order to protect their commercial interest in the diversion. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. at
420.
171 See supra note 175.
177 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
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recommendations and are not binding on either party.278 Second, neither
government has chosen to refer the issue of the Chicago diversion contro-
versy to the Commission.1 7 1 The Commission is composed primarily of
scientific experts whose functions have largely been investigative.21 0 To
impose the additional burden of resolving claims would undoubtedly de-
tract from its overall effectiveness as a neutral investigative body. Third,
if article II of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty applies, what are the
limits of "material injury?" ' 1 As one author suggests, the 1909 Treaty
provides no criteria for determining at what point a diversion would pro-
duce "material injury" to Canadian interests.18 2 Furthermore, the 1909
Treaty provides no guidance as to what weight the United States must
accord to Canadian protests.1 83
The IJC is also not a creative agency, but rather a reactive one.18' A
six-month cooperative study to consider the need for and formulation of
an improved management structure for the Great Lakes Basin concluded
that the Commission has neither the authority nor the resources to as-
sume planning functions. 8 5 The Commission's contribution has largely
been the resolution of problems on a case by case basis which captured
sufficient governmental interest to result in the required reference.186
Thus, the Commission does not provide a mechanism for the economic or
resource development of the Great Lakes Basin nor has it met the needs
'7' See D. PIPER, supra note 30, at 79.
7 The Commission has considered the Chicago diversion in several economic and envi-
ronmental evaluation studies of the Great Lakes Basin. In 1977, the Commission established
the International Great Lakes Diversions and Consumptive Uses Board to investigate the
effects of existing and proposed diversions within, into, or out of the basin. (In the Board's
current diversion study, it has chosen five alternatives for detailed hydrologic and economic
evaluation, one of which assumes no water would go through the three principal diversions
now existing; the Chicago, Long Lake/Ogoki, and the Welland Canal. The study will include
an estimate of the time at which the diversion alternatives would become totally impractical
due to lowered lake levels caused by increasing consumptive uses). In 1979, the Commission
also established the Great Lakes Levels Advisory Board responsible for advising the Com-
mission on activities that might have a significant impact on water supplies, levels and flows
of the Great Lakes. THE INTERNATIONAL JOUT COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT (1977, 1980).
180 See D. PIPER, supra note 30, at 110.
1I1 See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 2449 (art. 11).
'82 D. PIPER, supra note 30, at 95.
183 Id.
I" See M. RMGEWAY, supra note 38, at 158; Dworsky, Francis & Swezey, Management
of the International Great Lakes, 14 NAT. RESOURCcES J. 103, 119 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Dworsky].
188 Dworsky, supra note 184, at 119.
188 Id. A reference from either government is the initiating mechanism upon which the
Commission assumes its investigative and recommendatory functions as specified in the
terms of the reference. Id.
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and desires of the Great Lakes states compact.'87
IV. DECISIONMAKING IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN: FEDERALISM,
ECONOMIC ISSUES AND NATIONAL POLICY
The resources of the Great Lakes Basin provided the incentive for
enormous manufacturing and industrial development in the region. The
region's water resources presently support one-fifth of the U.S. popula-
tion and one-quarter of its industry. 88 The expansion of various uses of
the Great Lakes has underscored not only the physical limits of the basin,
but the conflict between those limits and other uses. 8 '
Over the past decade, the basin states have experienced a drastic de-
cline in economic prosperity. 9 ' The decline has been accompanied by a
dramatic shift of population and industry to the sun belt, the southern
tier of states stretching from California to Florida. 19' The shift in popula-
tion has accordingly resulted in a shift of regional political power in Con-
gress. 92 According to one observer, the political shift will favor those ar-
eas most inclined to seek diversion requests from the Great Lakes.
9 3
William Milliken, former Governer of Michigan, speaking to state and
provincial leaders at the 1982 Great Lakes Water Resources Conference
stated that the abundant supply of freshwater resources should serve as
the cornerstone of economic recovery in the Great Lakes region provided
that local leaders secure a greater voice and cooperate among them-
selves.' 4 Milliken's comment also reflects the concern that various re-
"I M. RIDGEWAY, supra note 38, at 158.
188 Statement of Marlene S. Evans, President of the International Association for Great
Lakes Research to the Science and Technology Committee, Subcommittee of Natural Re-
sources, Agricultural Resource and Environment (Feb. 25, 1982), reprinted in INTERNA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR GREAT LAKES RESEARCH, LAKES LETTER 15 (Mar. 1982) (available in
University of Michigan Great Lakes Library) [hereinafter cited as LAKES LETrER 15]. "More
than 59% of the steel production, 65% of the automobile production, and 70% of the iron
ore production in the United States is conducted in the... basin." Id. at 16.
188 Dworsky, supra note 184, at 105.
18 See LAKES LETTER 15, supra note 188, at 42. Unemployment in the midwestern steel
industry stands at 30% in the auto industry, 22%; coal employment fell 46% reflected by
the rise in production in the western Great Plains states. Since 1950, Detroit has lost 35% of
its population and Pittsburgh, 37%. Id.
18, Between the years 1970 and 1980, western and southern states increased their popu-
lation by approximately 22% while the Great Lakes averaged approximately a 4% increase.
See DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 10-11 (1981).
192 As a result of population shifts and subsequent Congressional redistricting, Califor-
nia, Florida, Texas and Arizona picked up a total of ten Congressional seats while Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York lost a total of thirteen seats. 40 CONG.
Q. WEEKLY REPORT 890 (Apr. 17, 1982).
193 See Quade, supra note 1, at 1067.
184 Proceedings, supra note 6, at 12.
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source management structures in the basin have not had the impact on
governmental decision-making that the states have desired.195 The ques-
tion remains, however, whether the states and provinces can assume
broad authority and if so, whether they are economically and politically 9'
capable to do so.
The political climate is certainly ripe for the states and provinces to
establish broad authority over the Great Lakes. President Reagan's advo-
cacy of a "new federalism" calls for the transfer of numerous federal pro-
grams to the states, fundamentally altering the allocation of governmen-
tal power.197 Canada's recently proposed constitutional reforms recognize
provincial self-determination in the control of natural resources. One U.S.
Department of Interior official testified before the Water Resources Sub-
committee that the Reagan Administration is formulating a national
water policy "grounded on the premise that water rights belong to the
states."
198
Responding to the policy shift, Representatives Berkeley Bedell of
Iowa and Ralph Regula of Ohio have introduced legislation that would
prohibit the sale or transfer of interstate water without the consent of all
states within the drainage basin. 99 Such measures, while undoubtedly so-
lidifying the Great Lakes states' position, are likely to produce regional
polarity and raise serious constitutional questions.200
'95 These concerns include the South Dakota sale, Golden supra note 1, at 80, and the
threat of future Great Lakes diversion proposals and the Supreme Court's decision in
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
'98 In 1981, the federal government closed a number of federal agencies concerned with
research and planning activities for the Great Lakes including the Argonne National Labo-
ratory, the Coastal Zone Management Programs and the Water Resources Center. LAKES
LETTER 15, supra note 188, at 14. These closures resulted in a funding loss of more than $9
million. Id. Total funding in 1981 for Great Lakes Research was approximately $30 million
with an estimated $27 million reduction in 1982. Id. at 20-21. No effort has been made to
transfer these activities to state agencies or universities. Id. at 21.
197 Water Resources, 12 ENvrL. REP. (BNA), No. 7, at 227 (July 12, 1981).
198 Id.
199 The text of Representative Bedell's bill states in relevant part:
[N]o state shall sell or otherwise transfer for use outside of such state, water
which is taken from any river or other body of surface water which is located in or
which passes through more than one state or any acquifer or other body of ground
water which underlies more than one state unless: (1) there is in effect an inter-
state compact (A) between the states in the drainage basin of such river or other
body of surface water or (B) between the affected states in the case of an acquifer
or other body of ground water which governs such sale or transfer, and (2) all the
states which are parties to such compact consent to such sale or transfer.
H.R. 5278, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Bedell's bill did not make it out of the Subcommit-
tee on Water and Power Resources of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
but Representative Regula introduced similar legislation in the present Congress. H.R. 977
and 1207, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984).
200 See generally supra notes 51-112 and accompanying text.
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One of the constitutional concerns is a theoretical notion that the
states might achieve some level of autonomous authority or sovereignty,
relative to the federal government. Neither the constitution itself nor the
framers' debates 01 offer much guidance on the definition of the relative
powers of state and national governments. Instead, the Constitution enu-
merates the national powers at length leaving to the states the unenumer-
ated reserve power in the tenth amendment.20 2 If anything is to be
learned from the history of centralized government, it is the faith and
confidence that has been placed in this structure to promote and protect
the general welfare of the public. 0 3 Thus, the new federalism debates
should focus upon public welfare, not on the protection of the states as
entities.20 4
One commentator proposes the assignment of power within the fed-
eralist framework according to the principles and interests of individual
liberty. 0 5 For example, the management of public lands and natural re-
sources in the West has evolved into a bitter conflict between western
states and the federal government. This conflict is popularly known as
the Sagebrush Rebellion.20 Western states, in effect, have adopted legis-
lation calling for the transfer of ownership of these lands to the states
based on the principle of states' rights.207 According to the individual lib-
erty analysis, the states should rightfully assume authority over private
benefits in public lands provided others do not have to pay the costs.208
Any shift of complete authority, however, would be at the expense of "in-
dividual liberty to the extent that federal [lands] like the national parks
and wilderness areas serve an essential function of connecting Americans
with the roots of their belief in individual freedom."209 The Great Lakes
states' proposal to impose autonomous authority over the lakes' resources
extends similarly beyond the authority over private benefits and exposes
the risk of placing regional interests ahead of national public interests.
The other constitutional concern turns predominantly on the com-
merce clause. It is under this authority that the states, with increasing
judicial deference, may achieve a greater level of freedom to tax, regulate
20I See generally A. MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATES (2d ed. 1972).
202 See Huffman, Governing America's Resources: Federalism in the 1980's, 12 ENVTL.
L. 863, 869-71 (1982).
203 Id. at 871.
204 Id. at 883.
2o5 Id. at 900.
206 See Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective
on the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENv'l. L. 847 (1982).
207 Id. at 849.
200 Huffman, supra note 202, at 900.
209 Id. at 901.
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or limit the development of natural resources within their borders.21 As
one commentator suggests, the states have exceptionally strong interests
in controlling their natural resources, an interest which the Court must
recognize as long as the states' measures are non-discriminatory and af-
fect others only through the marketplace.21 1
The scrutiny the states must overcome to defeat regional transfers of
water parallel the allocative efficiency goals of antitrust law.2"2 For exam-
ple, consider the Great Lakes states' and provinces' monopoly position by
assuming that the states are unwilling to sell their product-water, or at
least unwilling to sell it at the cost arid states or provinces are willing to
pay. In a competitive market, competition would force the price of water
down to the cost of producing or transfering plus a reasonable market
return. Thus, other water sellers would expand output to a point where
additional transfers of water would remain profitable. In a monopolistic
market, however, the price of water will rise forcing potential buyers to
consider the costs of alternatives. In the present case, for example, west-
ern farmers might switch to crops demanding less irrigation or possibly
foregoing crop production altogether. Without federal assistance, the con-
sequences for the nation's food production would be potentially disas-
trous. This is precisely the type of situation the antitrust laws were
designed to remedy and precisely why a Great Lakes compact with broad
powers would not survive commerce clause and compact consent
scrutiny.21 3
Taking the economic analysis one step further, the major problems
confronting the water resources of the Great Lakes are related to use,
210 See Stewart, supra note 68, at 242. The Court's deference to state regulations was
particularly apparent in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). In that case, the Court
upheld a state regulation that favored state residents in cement sales from a plant that was
owned and operated by the state. Id. at 447. The Court avoided commerce clause scrutiny
by invoking the market participant exemption first articulated in Huges v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). Reeves, 447 U.S. at 440. The implication is that the decision in
Reeves will lead to the possibility of a natural resource exemption to commerce clause anal-
ysis permitting states to hoard their own natural resources. The Court, however, recognized
that the rule was not universally applicable, but instead relied on the need to balance state
and national interests in maintaining a free flow of natural resources. Id. See Note, The
Commerce Clause and Federalism: Implications for State Control of Natural Resources, 50
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 601 (1982). The Court recently distinguished Reeves in New England
Power v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982). New Hampshire had sought to prohibit New
England Power from selling hydroelectric energy outside the state. Id. at 339. The Court
held that absent authorizing legislation, the Commerce Clause precludes a state from grant-
ing residents a preferred right of access to privately owned or produced natural resources.
Id. at 338-40. The Court invalidated the ban as simple economic protectionism and confined
the Reeves holding to state-produced products. Id. at 338-39 n.6.
:" Stewart, supra note 68, at 243.
211 See L. SuLLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 207 (1977).
213 See generally supra notes 57-82 and 102-17 and accompanying text.
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such as satisfying the numerous water use demands. Resource economists
approach the problem as one of conflicts between water users, economic
externalities inherent in water development, environmental impacts and
conservation. " To illustrate with a benefit-cost analysis: even if all pri-
mary and secondary benefits of a diversion proposal are calculable and
determined on a regional basis, "the incidence of the costs" of the project
will still affect its evaluation from a regional perspective. 215 To simplify, a
benefit-cost analysis considers the benefit to be the price that benefi-
ciaries of a project would be willing to pay for the project's output,
whereas the cost is the value of resources consumed for the project.2 1
Thus, the benefit-cost ratio is simply the dollar amount of benefit over
the dollar amount of cost. A benefit-cost ratio of less than one from a
national perspective is quite attractive to one region if most of the bene-
fits accrue to the residents of that region while the costs are distributed
throughout the country at large.21 7 On the other hand, a proposal with a
ratio greater than one from the nation's viewpoint is equally unattractive
for a region that must bear most of the costs. 218 For example, suppose
farmers would be willing to pay ten dollars for a unit of water while the
cost to the Great Lakes states or provinces would be twenty dollars due
to lost navigational and electrical generating revenues. The farmers, how-
ever, can produce forty dollars of crops per unit of water cost. If the fed-
eral government were to authorize such a transfer, the nation would bene-
fit in greater proportion than the loss to the regional interests of the
Great Lakes. Thus, the Great Lakes states and provinces are asked to
bear the cost of a project that appears to have a benefit-cost ratio of less
than one from the region's perspective, but a ratio of greater than one on
a national basis.
Nonetheless, if market conditions parallel predictions, the solution
would demand a common national, not regional market. Difficult trade-
offs are necessary; if the states and provinces do not recognize the na-
tional need, the federal governments will have to preempt state and pro-
vincial prerogatives. 29 Indeed, the states and provinces would enhance
their stature if they displayed an awareness of national and international
needs during the predicted resource crisis. 220
From a political perspective, assuming that the traditional federal-
214 See F. BUTRICO, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN 74
(1971).
216 Id.
21 See Jaffe, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Multi-Objective Evaluation of Federal Water
Projects, 4 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 58, 59 (1980).
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 See Lyons, Federalism and Resource Management, 12 ENvTL. L. 931, 943 (1982).
220 See C. HowE & K. EASTER, supra note 13, at 20.
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state relationship remains intact, the influence of the two provincial and
eight Great Lake state governments will continue to be of paramount im-
portance in future decisions affecting the basin. The fear, however, is that
the federal government will underwrite massive diversion projects to the
detriment of not only the basin states, but Canadian interests as well.221
The question then becomes who shall bear the cost when such proposals
become economically advantageous.
The states might argue that the utility of economic return as a public
objective is too narrow and fundamentally misleading, particularly when
applied to a resource as enormous and complex as the Great Lakes. With-
out sufficient regional control, important societal objectives other than ec-
onomic return may be overlooked or given shorthanded consideration.
Thus, the desirability of a diversion should depend on alternative factors
such as relieving local unemployment, maintaining the integrity of the
basin ecology, or stimulating the region's economy.222 The underlying ra-
tionale of the states, therefore, is to provide a mechanism to insure an
adequate flow of information required to make such a decision and that
the Great Lakes region will have a share in determining the eventual
outcome.
It must also be recognized that the independent sovereign status of
the United States and Canada mandates that the states and provinces
cannot settle international disputes on their own volition, although the
provinces, in theory, have limited authority to enter into treaties. Yet,
some level of state and provincial representation is not only politically
desirable, but is also essential if some modicum of cohesive management
and planning in the basin is to succeed. If decision-making regarding the
use and management of the Great Lakes or any interstate resource is to
remain responsive to varying interests, decisions must be based on both
diverse inputs of information and representation.
One study has already addressed the question of optimum resource
management for the U.S. portion of the Great Lakes.2 23 The-author con-
cluded that no institution is presently meeting the need for integration of
public authorities regarding the use and development of the Great Lakes
Basin.224 This need is critical since the primary issues confronting a ba-
sin-wide institution are the "conflicting goals based upon various values
and public preferences expressed and supported by different political
constituencies. '225 Since these issues are particularly adaptable to the po-
litical process, the chief function of a proposed basin-wide agency should
221 See Focus ON GREAT LAKES WATER QuALrrY, supra note 4, at 8.
222 See L. JAsS & R. LEE, ECONOMICS OF WATER RESOURCES PLANNING 165 (1971).
223 See APPENDIX 1, supra note 28, at 304.
224 Id.
225 Id.
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be to outline policy and the effective means for its implementation.226
The question of representation is crucial. The interests of the states, the
provinces, the federal governments, and the basin residents must be con-
sidered in future decisionmaking. 22'
Perhaps the only reasonable approach to satisfy these diverse inter-
ests, in light of the legal and political obstacles, is a fully integrated fed-
eral-interstate compact where the federal role remains largely coordina-
tive.2 28 As part of a trend toward intergovernmental relations, interstate
compacts have arisen in recognition of state interests, although certain
special interests and the lure of federal funds have also had immeasurable
effects. 229 The growth of compacts as an institution, however, "is taking
place in a somewhat legally undefined and politically uncharted area of
our constitutional system 2 °3 0 andtherefore requires closer supervision.
One governmental study has divided the legal and political criteria
concerning the merits of interstate compacts into six categories.231 First,
an interstate compact must be endowed with adequate legal and adminis-
trative authority. Even without congressional consent, the Supreme Court
has upheld the constitutionality of a multistate compact to impose inter-
state taxes, a power concededly beyond that which any member state
might exercise independently.2 8 2 With consent, express conferral of fed-
eral powers may cure any defects in state authority.233 If the federal gov-
ernment participated as a signatory party, the compact would essentially
attain the status of a federal agency and would, therefore, possess powers
as broad as Congress delegates. 23 4
Second, the creation, implementation and alteration of a compact
plan must be flexible and unencumbered in order to adapt to regional
physical and political changes. 2385 There is evidence that highly complex
agreements can be negotiated with impressive swiftness. 236 Acquiring the
necessary acceptance of eight state, two provincial and two federal gov-
ernments for a Great Lakes compact, however, would enhance ppportuni-
ties for delay and frustration. Such weaknesses might be obviated by ex-
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 The Great Lakes Compact may provide the structural framework for a broader Fed-
eral-interstate compact. See generally supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
220 See M. RIDGEWAY, supra note 38, at 293.
230 Id.
22I See J. Muvs, supra note 109, at 355-70.
212 Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
233 See J. Muvs, supra note 109, at 359.
234 Id.
225 Id.
226 Two examples are the Delaware River Basin and Susquehanna River Compacts dis-
cussed in J. Muvs, supra note 109, at 117-202.
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press congressional policy concerning interstate resource compacts and
liberalization of the ratification and consent process." 7
Third, interstate compacts must provide for public participation."'
Fourth, compacts must be able to coordinate and implement federal,
state, local and private interests. 23 9 Thus, the goal is to provide a regional
perspective to development and management of interstate resources in
which all regional interests, including the federal government, are com-
mitted to the purposes of the compact.
Fifth, compacts must display both political accountability and re-
sponsiveness.4 ° Consideration must be given to weighted representation
as opposed to traditional equality among states because each state has
widely disparate interests due to its respective geography, population and
share of the resources.
241
Sixth, an interstate compact must have the ability to attain regional
"visibility" and to attract adequate executive leadership.24 2 Traditionally,
interstate compacts have suffered from limited authority, inadequate
financial support and failure to attain significant authority.
243
In the final analysis, the most significant impediment to an interstate
compact are the sovereign and bureaucratic rivalries. If the Great Lakes
states are to succeed in establishing a regional authority over the basin, it
is essential that such concerns be put behind and the focus concentrated
on political and economic concerns. As one U.S. senator aptly stated:
"The simple truth is that.., we are far from one world politically. But by
necessity, if not by choice, we are one world environmentally. States have
sovereign rights-but so do people. We cannot rely on the political habits
of the past to save our environment of the future.'
244
V. CONCLUSION
The historical interpretation of the U.S. constitutional framework
has led to a centralization of powers within the federal government. The
237 Id. at 360-61.
S3 Id. at 362. The need for public participation reflects a concern that compacts, like
other institutional arrangements, must improve public access to governmental deci-
sionmakers. This might be accomplished through public hearings, advisory committees or
other channels. Id. at 361-62.
239 Id. at 362.
240 Id. at 366.
2 1 Consider Michigan's position. Virtually surrounded by water, the state holds a stra-
tegic position of potential control over Atlantic and interlake transportation to and from
Lake Superior, Lake Michigan and Lake Huron. Tourism and recreation on the lakes are
also major state industries. See M. RIDGEWAY, supra note 38, at 142-43.
242 See J. MuYs, supra note 109, at 367.
243 Id.
244 SATURDAY REvEw, Aug. 7, 1971, at 50 (statement of Senator Edmund Muskie).
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recent trend toward decentralization is an attempt to narrow the gap be-
tween decision-makers and constituents and to assure that the burden of
governmental regulation is borne by those who are willing to pay and ac-
cept the consequences. The trend, however, cannot be regarded as a
sweep of autonomous authority from federal to state government. Noth-
ing in the Constitution or its history supports such a proposition. Govern-
ment exists not for its own sake, but for the individuals it serves. It is
primarily the trust placed in the federal government that individual au-
tonomy will not be shackled by local constraints.
Both the market and non-market values at stake in the natural re-
source area present particular concerns that resist broad legal proposi-
tions that these resources belong either to the nation or to the states. It is
encouraging to note the U.S. Supreme Court's retreat from deciding in-
terstate resource disputes on its traditionally rigid posture of maintaining
open markets. Natural resources are often the only means for economi-
cally depressed states to attract industry and revenue. This is true
whether it is for conservation or exploitation.
The Great Lakes Basin is perhaps the most poignant example of the
struggle between regional and national interests concerning natural re-
sources. While the region presently lacks an institution with broad repre-
sentation and authority, the impending threats of a water resource crisis
will require a viable solution. This solution must be based on cooperative
efforts, not on declarations of federal preemption or state or provincial
autonomy. Without doubt, the federal governments have ample authority
to authorize regional transfers of water, and perhaps it is only a matter of
time before the benefits of these proposals outweigh their costs. From the
states and provinces' point of view, however, exercising supreme power in
favor of one region to the detriment of another is as arbitrary as empha-
sizing economic benefits and de-emphasizing non-market benefits simply
because it is in the national interest. Equally compelling is the concern
that regional authority over interstate resources will create regional mo-
nopolies. Furthermore, there is no precedent for regional authorities to
share equal footing with the federal government.
Accordingly, there is need for a novel approach to these problems. An
interstate compact consisting of regional and national representation ap-
pears to be the most attractive institutional framework for the Great
Lakes Basin. The interstate compact can be structured to deal with
changing conditions and to fulfill the purposes for which the compact was
created. Whatever the outcome, it will likely have far-reaching implica-
tions on the future of national resource allocation and the bounds of per-
missible state and provincial authority in both the U.S. and Canadian
federalist systems.
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